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INTRODUCTION  
The Sixth Amendment mandates that a criminal defendant shall 
have the right to “the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”1  A 
defendant who claims that ineffective assistance of counsel denied 
their Sixth Amendment right “must generally demonstrate prejudice 
to the result of the trial.”2  This prejudice requirement, set forth by 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Strickland v. Washington, requires that 
defendants must generally show that the ineffective assistance had a 
“probable effect upon the outcome of trial.”3  However, in some 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2. See Mark W. Shiner, Note, Conflicts of Interest Challenges Post Mickens v. 
Taylor: Redefining the Defendant’s Burden in Concurrent, Successive, and Personal 
Interest Conflicts, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 965, 967 (2003). 
 3. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174 (2002) (interpreting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
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instances, “[i]f the ineffective assistance of counsel claim stems from a 
conflict of interest that hampered the defendant’s attorney, a 
defendant may face a burden somewhat less than a showing of 
prejudice.”4  This standard, set forth by the Supreme Court in Cuyler 
v. Sullivan, requires “a showing of defective performance”5 by 
counsel, but unlike the Strickland standard, does not require the 
defendant to demonstrate prejudice.6  In Sullivan, the Supreme Court 
determined that such a presumption of prejudice applies to instances 
where an attorney’s conflict of interest arises from representing two 
or more clients concurrently.7  Should such a presumption apply to 
other conflicts of interest as well? 
In 2002, the Supreme Court examined the issue in dicta in Mickens 
v. Taylor but declined to rule on the matter, instead declaring it “an 
open question.”8  Since Mickens, lower state courts have adopted 
diverging approaches to the issue.9  The answer to this question can 
determine whether a conviction, even a capital murder conviction,10 is 
overturned or upheld.11 
Part I of this Note examines the types of conflicts of interest that 
arise in ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  Part II examines the 
Supreme Court history behind conflict-of-interest law.  Part III 
examines the way state courts have differentiated between conflict-of-
interest claims that are eligible for the Sullivan exception or require 
Strickland since the Supreme Court declared the issue an open 
question in Mickens.  Part IV provides a recommendation for how 
lower courts should differentiate between conflicts that require 
Strickland prejudice and conflicts that are eligible for the Sullivan 
exception. 
I. TYPES OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
A conflict of interest (conflict) inherently divides the loyalty of 
counsel.  A conflict exists where “there is a significant risk that a 
 
 4. Shiner, supra note 2, at 967. 
 5. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174. 
 6. See id. at 171. Prejudice in this context means a “showing of probable effect 
upon the outcome of trial.” Id. at 174. 
 7. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349–50 (1980). 
 8. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 176. Mickens was “presented and argued on the 
assumption that (absent some exception for failure to inquire) Sullivan would be 
applicable,” but “the language of Sullivan itself does not clearly establish, or indeed 
even support, such expansive application” of Sullivan. Id. at 174–75. 
 9. See discussion infra Part III. 
 10. See State v. Cheatham, 292 P.3d 318 (Kan. 2013). 
 11. See discussion, infra Parts I–II. 
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lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate 
course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of 
the lawyer’s other responsibilities or interests.”12  The impact a 
conflict can have on a trial is “notoriously hard to predict” for “[i]t is 
a rare attorney who will be fortunate enough to learn the entire truth 
from his own client, much less be fully apprised before the trial of 
what each of the Government’s witnesses will say on the stand.”13  
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules),14 
conflicts of interest can arise under four categories: counsel’s duties to 
another client, to a former client, to a third person, or to counsel’s 
own interests.15  Courts have dealt with different conflicts in different 
ways. 
A. Duties to Another Client  
i. Multiple Representation of Codefendants 
Multiple representation occurs when defense counsel 
simultaneously represents codefendants who have been jointly 
charged with the same or similar crimes.16  Multiple representation 
can be highly prejudicial to a defendant because, in such scenarios, 
counsel’s loyalty is inherently divided.17  The Model Rules note that 
when an attorney represents multiple clients for a single matter, the 
attorneys must obtain informed consent from both clients.18  Counsel 
must inform their clients of the possible risks of the multiple 
representation, including effects from counsel’s divided loyalty, 
strains on confidentiality, and limitations due to attorney-client 
privilege.19  In addition, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
require a court to inquire about a conflict of interest in a prototypical 
 
 12. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see also 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 356, n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part) (noting that “‘[c]onflict 
of interest’ is a term that is often used and seldom defined” and looking to the ABA 
standards for guidance). 
 13. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162–63 (1988). 
 14. Note that under Strickland, “prevailing norms of practice as reflected in 
American Bar Association Standards and the like are guides to determining what is 
reasonable, but they are only guides.” Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
 15. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 16. See Bruce A. Green, “Through A Glass, Darkly”: How the Court Sees 
Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1203 
(1989). 
 17. See id. at 1204. 
 18. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 18 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 19. See id. r. 1.7 cmt. 18, 30. 
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multiple representation scenario.20  Nearly every instance of multiple 
representation is a potential conflict of interest.21  Nevertheless, 
multiple representation is permissible under the Sixth Amendment so 
long as it does not lead to an actual conflict of interest.22  If a 
defendant objects to multiple representation at trial, they shall 
receive the chance to demonstrate that the conflict will 
“impermissibly imperil his right to a fair trial.”23 
The Supreme Court in Holloway v. Arkansas24 and Sullivan 
discussed the dangers of attorneys representing multiple defendants 
who have conflicting interests.25  The impact of multiple 
representation can be difficult to detect by a reviewing court because 
multiple representation of codefendants can cause counsel at any 
point during representation to limit their advocacy for one client in 
deference to the interests of the other client.26  In other words, 
multiple representation can cause counsel to “pull his punches.”27  
For example, counsel representing two clients facing similar charges 
may forego plea and cooperation negotiations with the prosecution, 
with respect to one defendant, in hopes of getting a better sentence 
for the codefendant.28  Multiple representation of codefendants can 
keep counsel from challenging the admission of evidence that is 
damaging to one client because it is beneficial to the other.29  It can 
also keep counsel from arguing that one defendant is less culpable 
and therefore deserves a lesser sentence than the codefendant.30  In 
addition, prejudice to a defendant from multiple representation can 
be hard to detect.31  In Holloway, the Supreme Court noted that it 
 
 20. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 175 (2002) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 
44(c)). 
 21. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). 
 22. Id. “Absent special circumstances . . . trial courts may assume either that 
multiple representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients 
knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist.” Id. at 346–47. 
 23. Id. at 348. 
 24. 435 U.S. 475, 490–91 (1978). 
 25. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Antagonism, Sexual Betrayal, Graft, and 
More: Rethinking and Remedying the Universe of Defense Counsel Failings, 97 
WASH. U. L. REV. 57, 70 (2019); see also Green, supra note 16, at 1206. 
 26. See Johnson, supra note 25, at 70 (quoting Holloway, 435 U.S. at 489–90). 
 27. See Green, supra note 16, at 1221. 
 28. See Holloway, 435 U.S. at 489–90. 
 29. See id. at 490. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
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would be “virtually impossible” to evaluate a conflict’s impact on an 
attorney’s decision-making process and tactics in plea negotiations.32 
Because multiple concurrent representations have both a high 
probability of prejudice arising and a difficulty of proving said 
prejudice,33 such conflicts are entitled to a presumption of prejudice 
on post-conviction review.34  Multiple representation, however, does 
not always entail an actual conflict of interest, indeed in some cases 
codefendants may benefit from a common defense attorney.35  This is 
why under Supreme Court law, an actual conflict of interest must also 
adversely affect representation.36 
ii. Duties to Another Client Outside of Multiple                         
Representation of Codefendants 
Sometimes counsel might face divided loyalty between helping one 
client who is on trial or helping another client who is not on trial.  In 
Wood v. Georgia, three defendants who worked at an adult 
entertainment store were charged with distributing obscene 
materials.37  The defendants were represented by the entertainment 
store’s lawyer.38  The defendants were under the impression that their 
employer would pay both their legal and court fees — and their 
employer did for the most part.39  However, the defendants were 
convicted and received several-thousand-dollar fines from the court, 
and their employer failed to pay these fines with no explanation.40  
The Supreme Court speculated that the employer might have 
withheld the fine payments in order to create standing for a 
constitutional “test case” — where the employer was seeking to avoid 
paying their employees’ court-imposed fines but did not want its 
employees jailed as a result.41  Because defense counsel represented 
both the employer and the employees, it was unclear whether counsel 
 
 32. See id. at 491. 
 33. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 175 (2002). 
 34. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (discussing Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345–50 (1980)). 
 35. See Green, supra note 16, at 1206. Some benefits of multiple representation 
include a bond between codefendants, the trust of a specific lawyer, financial 
benefits, and distrust of the prosecution’s motives for trying to disqualify defense 
counsel. See id. at 1206 n.26. 
 36. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 164. 
 37. 450 U.S. 261, 263–64 (1981). 
 38. See id. at 266. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. at 263–64. 
 41. Id. at 267. 
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“single-mindedly” pursued the defendants’ liberty interests.42  If, 
indeed, defense counsel tried to make a test case out of the 
defendants’ situation, it would have highly prejudiced the defendants.  
In addition, the conflict created by defense counsel’s divided loyalty 
between the employer and employees was potentially diffused 
throughout the proceeding and was therefore hard to detect.  The 
Court “c[ould not] be sure whether counsel was influenced in his 
basic strategic decisions by the interests of the employer who hired 
him.”43  If defense counsel was serving the interests of the employer 
to the disadvantage of the employee defendants during the 
employees’ court proceedings, the employees’ constitutional rights 
would have been violated.44 
B. Duties to a Former Client 
An attorney may have a conflict of interest between a current and 
former client if that former client is implicated in the current client’s 
legal dispute –– this is known as successive representation.45  The 
Model Rules note that “[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a 
client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the 
same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests 
are materially adverse to the interests of the former client” unless that 
former client gives written informed consent.46  The degree of 
prejudice that arises from successive representation cases depends on 
the context of counsel’s relationship with the former client.47 
For example, in State v. Alvarado, a defendant was convicted of 
multiple violent crimes.48  The defendant appealed his conviction 
claiming that his public defender had an actual conflict of interest 
because defense counsel had previously represented a prosecution 
 
 42. Id. at 272. 
 43. Id.; see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 170–71 (2002) (noting how the 
remand instruction in Wood “was shorthand for the statement in Sullivan”). 
 44. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171. 
 45. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Ex parte Kelley, No. WR-87,470-01, 2019 WL 5788034, at *33 (Tex. Crim. 
App. Nov. 6, 2019) (Newell, J., concurring) (“Conflicts may be based on former 
clients, if that client is a now a prosecution witness. But if that former client is not a 
witness, the potential conflict never becomes an actual conflict.” In instances where a 
former client does not testify against the defendant, “counsel never [has] the 
opportunity to cross-examine him [so] [a]ny potential conflict never became an actual 
conflict of interest.” (citing Ex parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d 743, 759 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2005))). 
 48. 481 P.3d 737, 743 (Idaho 2021). 
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witness.49  The defendant argued that defense counsel’s continuing 
ethical obligations to the witness prevented a rigorous cross 
examination of that witness.50  However, because the conflict was 
limited to one witness, the impact of the conflict was both discrete 
and discernable.51  The Supreme Court of Idaho examined the record 
of the cross examination to see if it adversely affected the defendant.52  
The court found that defense counsel attempted to impeach the 
witness’ credibility by attempting to ask about the witness’ own 
incarceration; the trial court, however, prevented defense counsel 
from pursuing this line of questioning.53  The Idaho Supreme Court 
determined that defense counsel’s attempt at impeaching the witness 
meant that counsel was not holding back in his advocacy of the 
defendant in favor of his former client.  The conflict of interest, 
therefore, had no adverse effect on the defendant, and the defendant 
was not prejudiced from the potential conflict of interest due to 
defense counsel’s successive representation.54 
C. Duties to a Third Party 
Defendants have questioned their attorney’s loyalty based on many 
other reasons, including defense counsel’s role as an administrative 
leader in the office,55 counsel obtaining a new job,56 counsel’s 
 
 49. See id. at 740. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. at 746; cf. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490–91 (1978) 
(discussing how joint representation is suspect because of what it prevents counsel 
from doing at any point throughout the legal proceedings and is therefore difficult to 
detect). 
 52. See Alvarado, 481 P.3d at 746. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. at 748–49. The court notes that that successive representation 
“amounts to a cosmetic crack in the exterior of the trial proceedings; the overall 
foundation — and our confidence in the outcome — remains firm nonetheless. For 
these reasons, we hold that claims of conflict of interest relating to successive 
representation require a showing of actual prejudice,” and holding that the defendant 
was not denied his right to conflict-free counsel. Id. 
 55. See Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 698–700 (Ind. 2019) (declining to apply 
Sullivan to an alleged conflict of interest in which the defendant claimed that trial 
counsel –– who was the Chief Public Defender and therefore charged with efficiently 
administering public funds for the office –– could not provide effective representation 
in defendant’s capital case because it would be a strain on the office’s resources). 
 56. See Flaherty v. State, 221 So. 3d 633, 634–37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) 
(applying Sullivan and finding no actual conflict of interest in a case where an 
assistant state attorney criminally charged a defendant, provided discovery, offered 
the defendant a plea deal, and then became defendant’s defense attorney at trial); see 
also Catala v. State, 897 A.2d 257, 260, 271 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (applying 
Sullivan and finding no actual conflict of interest where during the course of 
2021] PRESUMED PREJUDICE 229 
relationship to their boss,57 and counsel’s personal feelings to a third 
party.58 
One example of a conflict arising out of defense counsel’s loyalty to 
a third party was in Acosta v. State.59  In Acosta, two Texas appellate 
courts considered a conflict-of-interest claim where the defendant 
claimed that defense counsel had a conflict of interest when counsel 
put forward evidence at trial that was solely beneficial to the 
defendant’s wife’s efforts to retain custody of her children.60  Counsel 
admitted his actions were “solely to help” the defendant’s wife and it 
was “no help whatsoever” to the defendant.61  The Court of Criminal 
Appeals of Texas noted that “[a]n ‘actual conflict of interest’ exists if 
counsel is required to make a choice between advancing his client’s 
interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests (perhaps counsel’s 
own) to the detriment of his client’s interest.”62  The court likened 
defense counsel’s actions arising from the conflicted representation as 
“a clear example of how the danger of ineffective assistance via a 
conflict of interest is not strictly limited to the codefendant context.”63  
Nevertheless, the impact of the conflict was limited to the evidence 
that was admitted to assist the wife, and the court only needed to look 
to that part of the trial record to discern whether the conflict 
adversely impacted the defendant.64 
D. The Lawyer’s Own Interests 
Under the Model Rules, “[t]he lawyer’s own interests should not 
be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a 
 
representing the defendant, defense counsel had accepted a position with the State 
Attorney’s office and was slated to begin his new employment shortly after 
defendant’s trial.). 
 57. See Hall v. Jackson, 854 S.E.2d 539, 544 (Ga. 2021) (applying Sullivan and 
granting habeas relief to a defendant who claimed that his public defender appellate 
counsel had a conflict of interest when appellate counsel did not argue on appeal that 
trial counsel –– who was Chief Assistant Public Defender and therefore appellate 
counsel’s boss –– was ineffective as the defendant’s trial counsel). 
 58. See People v. Tolbert, No. 1-18-0117, 2021 IL. App. (1st) 180117-U, ¶¶ 1,17 
(Mar. 15, 2021) (applying Sullivan and finding no actual conflict of interest where 
appellate counsel did not argue that trial counsel was ineffective on appeal –– trial 
counsel was appellate counsel’s uncle, co-counsel, and former employer). 
 59. See 233 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. at 352 (quoting the record). 
 62. Id. at 355 (quoting Monreal v. State, 947 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2007)). 
 63. See id. at 354. 
 64. See id.; see also infra Sections IV.A–B. 
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client.”65  For example, if trial counsel also argues an appeal for a 
defendant, counsel might be put in the awkward position of 
determining whether or not to argue that they provided ineffective 
assistance at trial.66  In addition, media rights are an area that often 
implicates the lawyer’s own interests.67  Under the Model Rules, “[a]n 
agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights 
concerning the conduct of the representation creates a conflict 
between the interests of the client and the personal interests of the 
lawyer.”68 
Furthermore, a lawyer’s interests can be implicated when counsel is 
paid by someone other than the defendant.  Under the Model Rules, 
“[a] lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including 
a co-client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the 
arrangement does not compromise the lawyer’s duty of loyalty or 
independent judgment to the client.”69  Attorneys cannot represent a 
client under such circumstances unless the lawyer determines that the 
fee arrangement will not interfere with their professional judgment 
and obtains informed consent from the client.70 
One example case alleging counsel’s divided loyalties is Sola-
Morales v. State.71  In Sola-Morales, the defendant brought an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim noting that counsel purportedly 
lied to his client about making motions to dismiss and subsequently 
tried to cover up the lie.72  This purported lie and coverup allegedly 
gave counsel a personal conflict of interest in representing the 
 
 65. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 66. See People v. Huggins, 463 P.3d 294, 302 (Colo. App. 2019) (applying 
Strickland and denying relief finding no conflict of interest between attorney and 
client where trial counsel failed to consider his own ineffective assistance as an 
argument when filing an appeal for defendant). 
 67. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 68. Id.; see also Echols v. State, 127 S.W.3d 486, 494 (Ark. 2003) (applying 
Strickland and denying relief where trial counsel entered into a film contract with 
HBO because “counsel acted in [defendant’s] interest, and that his defense was 
aided, not impeded, by the film contract”). 
 69. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see 
also Acklin v. State, 266 So. 3d 89, 108 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 
1374 (2019) (mem.) (applying Sullivan and finding no actual conflict when defense 
counsel’s “failure to present potential mitigating evidence regarding domestic abuse 
[by defendant’s father who was paying the attorney bills] to the jury and trial judge 
was not because of a conflict of interest with [defendant’s] father — it was 
because [defendant] made the conscious decision that he did not want this evidence 
presented at trial”). 
 70. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 71. 451 P.3d 887 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019) (mem.). 
 72. See id. 
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defendant.73  On review, the Kansas Court of Appeals determined 
that there was no actual conflict of interest and that it did not 
adversely affect counsel’s representation and therefore denied relief.74 
Another example case alleging counsel’s divided loyalties, this time 
due to a fee arrangement, is State v. Cheatham.75  Cheatham was a 
capital murder case in which the defendant was convicted and 
sentenced to death.76  In a post-conviction proceeding, the defendant 
argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel partially due 
to his attorney’s flat fee arrangement at trial.77  The trial court 
determined that defense counsel did have an improper fee agreement 
and even noted that counsel “had no business taking on a death 
penalty case.”78  However, the trial court applied Strickland to the 
defendant’s claims, did not find that the defendant was prejudiced by 
his attorney’s conduct and upheld the defendant’s conviction.79 
On appeal, the state supreme court determined that the district 
court erred when evaluating the defendant’s conflict “solely under the 
Strickland standards.”80  The court instead evaluated the conflict of 
interest with a Sullivan presumption of prejudice, determined that 
relief was warranted, and reversed the defendant’s conviction.81  In 
evaluating the appeal, the state supreme court first looked at whether 
the flat fee arrangement was an actual conflict of interest and found 
that it was.82  The court noted American Bar Association guidelines 
disapprove of flat fee arrangements in death-penalty cases.83  Defense 
counsel did have an actual conflict of interest because he was a solo 
practitioner with a high caseload who had a financial incentive to 
devote his attention to cases for which he could bill rather than the 
capital case.84  The defendant was, therefore, likely to be highly 
prejudiced by the conflict of interest and the impact of the conflict 
would be difficult to pinpoint.  The court next looked at whether 
counsel’s conflict of interest adversely affected the defendant’s 
 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. 292 P.3d 318 (Kan. 2013). 
 76. See id. at 321. 
 77. See id. at 337. 
 78. Id. at 322. 
 79. See id. at 322. 
 80. Id. at 338. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. at 340. 
 83. See id. at 341. 
 84. See id. at 341–42. 
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representation.85  The court found that yes, there was an adverse 
effect on defendant’s representation –– counsel’s death-penalty 
representation “bore a greater resemblance to a personal hobby 
engaged in for diversion rather than an occupation that carried with it 
a responsibility for zealous advocacy.”86  Furthermore, the impact of 
the conflict was diffused throughout the trial process.  The court did 
not pinpoint one specific instance in which the defendant received 
ineffective assistance of counsel, but rather reasoned that defense 
counsel spent 200 hours defending his client, which was “appallingly 
low for a death penalty case defense and even more stunning when all 
but 60 of those hours, as [defense counsel] testified, were spent in 
trial.”87  The court also noted that defense counsel failed to 
investigate leads, retain an investigator and assemble a defense 
team.88 
In sum, when the lower court evaluated defendant’s post-
conviction claim under Strickland, the defendant could not 
demonstrate that defense counsel’s conflict of interest prejudiced the 
defendant.  As a result, the defendant’s murder conviction stood.89  
However, when the state supreme court evaluated the same claim 
under the Sullivan “prophylaxis,”90 presuming prejudice, the 
defendant’s conviction was overturned.91 
II. SUPREME COURT HISTORY ON CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST LAW 
A. The General Rule for Evaluating Ineffective                          
Assistance of Counsel Claims 
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court set forth the 
general test for interpreting claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.92  The Strickland test has two parts.93  First, a defendant must 
 
 85. See id. at 342. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. at 327. 
 90. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 176 (2002). 
 91. See Cheatham, 292 P.3d. at 342. 
 92. 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 
140, 147 (2006) (“[O]ur recognition of the right to effective counsel within the Sixth 
Amendment was a consequence of our perception that representation by counsel ‘is 
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.’” (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685)). 
 93. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
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demonstrate deficient performance by counsel.94  Deficient 
performance means that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed [to] the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment.”95  Under this first prong, a defendant who 
wishes to argue that they received ineffective assistance of counsel 
has to demonstrate that counsel’s representation was less than “an 
objective standard of reasonableness.”96  Second, the defendant has to 
establish that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.97  Under this prong, the defendant must demonstrate that 
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”98  If a defendant fails to prove either prong of the 
Strickland test, then there is no “breakdown in the adversary process 
that render[s] the result of the proceeding unreliable, and the 
sentence or conviction should stand.”99 
Surmounting a Strickland claim is a difficult task.100  This is largely 
due to the prejudice requirement.101  The Supreme Court has a 
prejudice requirement for a couple of reasons. 
First, a prejudice requirement helps a court determine whether 
counsel was –– despite deficient performance in one area –– overall 
effective in their representation of the defendant or whether counsel’s 
ineffectiveness had a negative impact on the jury.102  The Court 
considers this balance because a defendant’s constitutional right to 
the effective assistance of counsel is based on the Sixth Amendment’s 
purpose of ensuring a fair trial.103  For counsel to be considered 
constitutionally ineffective, a court must reasonably believe that 
counsel’s mistake actually harmed the defense –– i.e., was 
prejudiced.104  As the Court held in Gonzalez: 
 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 688. 
 97. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147. 
 98. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
 99. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 100. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). 
 101. See Daniel J. Capra & Joseph Tartakovsky, Why Strickland Is the Wrong Test 
for Violations of the Right to Testify, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 95, 141–42 (2013) 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 
 102. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. 
 103. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146–47 (2006) (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 
(1984). 
 104. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147. 
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The requirement that a defendant show prejudice in effective 
representation cases arises from the very nature of the specific 
element of the right to counsel at issue there — effective (not 
mistake-free) representation.  Counsel cannot be “ineffective” 
unless his mistakes have harmed the defense (or, at least, 
unless it is reasonably likely that they have).  Thus, a violation 
of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is 
not “complete” until the defendant is prejudiced.105 
Prejudice establishes that a violation of a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to effective representation actually happened.106 
Second, a prejudice requirement promotes finality.  Courts 
evaluating structural errors107 generally must balance two elements: a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial108 and the “profound importance of 
finality in criminal proceedings.”109  If there is a structural error at 
trial, defense counsel objects, and the issue is raised on direct appeal, 
then a defendant can receive automatic reversal and need not 
demonstrate that the error prejudiced their trial –– the balance of the 
scale is in favor of ensuring a fair trial.110  When a court reviews a 
structural error as a Strickland claim, however, it is generally after 
time has elapsed and “the costs and uncertainties of a new trial are 
greater.”111  The Court has cautioned how a Strickland claim can be 
“a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture” by presenting issues 
for appellate review that were not presented at trial.112  For this 
reason, the Strickland standard should be applied with “scrupulous 
care, lest ‘intrusive post-trial inquiry’ threaten the integrity of the very 
adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve,”113  hence the 
prejudice requirement of Strickland.114  In other words, on post-
conviction review, the balance of the scale weighs in favor of finality, 
and Strickland demands that a court be very confident before 
overturning a conviction due to counsel’s error.115 
 
 105. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685). 
 106. Id. at 150. 
 107. A structural error is an error which affects the framework of the procedure of 
the trial. See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017). 
 108. See id. at 1913. 
 109. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693–94 (1984). 
 110. See Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910. 
 111. Id. at 1912. 
 112. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). 
 113. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–90). 
 114. See Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1913. 
 115. See Capra & Tartakovsky, supra note 101, at 141–42 (citing Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 697). 
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B. Exceptions to Strickland’s Prejudice Requirement  
Despite the general rule that a defendant claiming relief for a Sixth 
Amendment violation must establish prejudice, there are some 
exceptions.116  These exceptions are of a “magnitude”117 in which the 
circumstances are “so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of 
litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.”118  These 
circumstances exist when the defendant is denied counsel entirely or 
denied counsel during a critical stage of a legal proceeding.119  These 
circumstances also may arise when a defense attorney actively 
represents conflicting interests.120 
In Holloway, defense counsel objected to his multiple 
representation of codefendants, seeking separate counsel.121  The trial 
court denied the request for separate counsel and refused to let 
defense counsel cross-examine the other codefendants.122  The 
Supreme Court created a rule of automatic reversal –– not requiring a 
demonstration of prejudice –– “where counsel is forced to represent 
codefendants over his timely objection, unless the trial court has 
determined that there is no conflict.”123 
In Sullivan, three codefendants were accused of murder and tried 
separately but were represented by the same defense counsel.124  
Unlike in Holloway, no one objected to the defense counsel’s 
multiple representation at trial.125  Defense counsel even noted that 
 
 116. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002); see also Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 
1911 (noting that the prejudice inquiry set forth in Strickland “is not meant to be 
applied in a ‘mechanical’ fashion. For when a court is evaluating an ineffective-
assistance claim, the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on ‘the fundamental fairness 
of the proceeding’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696)). 
 117. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). 
 118. Id. at 658. 
 119. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658–59); see also 
Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1911. In Weaver, the Supreme Court assumed but did not hold 
that a defendant could demonstrate prejudice merely by showing fundamental 
unfairness. See id. at 1911–12. In that case a defendant argued his counsel was 
ineffective when failing to object to the closure of the courtroom in jury selection. 
See id. at 1905. 
 120. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166; see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 
(1942) (“The ‘assistance of counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order 
requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests.”). 
 121. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 478 (1978). 
 122. See id. 
 123. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168 (citing Holloway, 435 U.S. at 488). 
 124. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 337 (1980). 
 125. See id. at 337–38. 
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the codefendant’s interests were aligned.126  The Sullivan Court noted 
that absent an objection to conflicted representation, if a defendant 
demonstrates that an actual conflict of interest “actually affected the 
adequacy of his representation [he] need not demonstrate 
prejudice in order to obtain relief.”127  In such instances, “[p]rejudice 
is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively 
represented conflicting interests’ and that ‘an actual conflict of 
interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’”128  If a 
defendant cannot satisfy the two-prong test of Sullivan –– by failing to 
demonstrate a conflict of interest or by failing to demonstrate the 
conflict’s adverse impact on the case –– a court can still consider the 
claim under the higher Strickland standard.129 
In essence, in Sullivan, the Court found a middle ground ––
 between the automatic-reversal standard of Holloway and the 
prejudice standard of Strickland.  This middle ground was for 
defendants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to an 
unpreserved conflict of interest.  Sullivan is an exception to the 
“general rule” outlined in Strickland.130  The Sullivan exception 
negates the second prong of the Strickland test –– requiring a 
demonstration of prejudice.131 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has indicated that when applying 
the Sullivan test, a defendant must still meet the first prong of the 
Strickland test –– demonstrating that counsel’s performance was 
defective by falling below an objective standard of reasonableness.132 
However, if a defendant can demonstrate that counsel was burdened 
by an actual conflict of interest, the defendant can likely demonstrate 
that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
 
 126. See id. at 347–48. 
 127. Id. at 349–50 (citations omitted). 
 128. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. 
at 350, 348). 
 129. See, e.g., Hinkle v. Williams, No. 19-0941, 2020 WL 6482756, at *3 (W. Va. 
Nov. 4, 2020) (applying Strickland to defendant’s conflict-of-interest claim after 
determining that defendant failed to demonstrate that the alleged conflict of interest 
was not an actual conflict of interest — failing the Sullivan test); see also Gibson v. 
State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 699–700 (Ind. 2019) (noting that defendant’s conflict-of-
interest claim is claim is “essentially a repackaging” of his other ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims). 
 130. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002). 
 131. See id. at 174. 
 132. See id. (differentiating the Sullivan and Strickland tests, whereby when 
Sullivan is applicable the test “require[es] a showing of defective performance, 
but [does] not require[] in addition (as Strickland does in other ineffectiveness-of-
counsel cases), a showing of probable effect upon the outcome of trial”). 
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reasonableness –– thereby satisfying the first prong of the Strickland 
test.  For counsel who breaches “the most basic of counsel’s duties” 
by operating with an actual conflict of interest is de facto providing 
representation below an objective standard of reasonableness.133 
The purpose of the Sullivan exception is to give a “needed 
prophylaxis in situations where Strickland itself is evidently 
inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.”134  These are situations where the conviction will 
reasonably be regarded as fundamentally unfair.135 
In Mickens, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the default rule to 
evaluate Sixth Amendment violations is governed by Strickland.  “As 
a general matter, a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment violation 
must demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.’”136 
III. EXAMINING HOW STATE COURTS HAVE APPLIED                       
SULLIVAN POST-MICKENS 
Some state courts never apply Sullivan outside of multiple 
representation, some courts apply Sullivan to certain conflicts beyond 
multiple representation, and some apply Sullivan to all conflict-of-
interest claims. In addition, some states apply a higher standard of 
review to conflict-of-interest claims. 
A. States That Never Apply Sullivan Beyond Instances of            
Multiple Representation 
Some state courts, such as Colorado, Idaho, and Pennsylvania, 
have adopted judicial policies that effectively never apply Sullivan 
outside of conflicts of interest arising from multiple representation. 
 
 133. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (discussing how “[r]epresentation of a criminal 
defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel’s function is to assist the defendant, 
and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest”); id. at 692 (discussing when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of 
interest “counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel’s 
duties”); see also Mickens, 535 U.S. at 180 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (The Supreme 
Court has “long recognized the paramount importance of the right to effective 
assistance of counsel. ‘Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be 
represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert 
any other rights he may have.’” (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653–
54 (1984)). 
 134. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 176. 
 135. See id. at 167 n.1. 
 136. Id. at 166 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
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i. Colorado 
In 2015, the Colorado Supreme Court assumed in dicta that 
Sullivan applies to all conflicts of interest. However, in 2019, a 
Colorado appeals court formally ruled that Strickland is the 
governing standard for conflict-of-interest claims outside of multiple 
representation. 
In 2015, when ruling on a conflict-of-interest case in West v. 
People, the Supreme Court of Colorado assumed for the purposes of 
argument that Sullivan applies to conflict claims arising from 
successive representation, but declined to specifically hold that it 
does.137  In making this assumption, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
considered the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court applied the Sullivan 
prophylaxis in Mickens –– a case in which the conflict was not a 
prototypical multiple representation, rather it was a conflict of 
interest based on defense counsel’s previous representation of the 
very same victim the defendant was convicted of murdering.138  In 
noting the two prongs of a Sullivan claim –– a conflict of interest that 
adversely affects counsel’s representation –– the West court set forth 
a test to determine adverse effect.139  First, a defendant must identify 
a “plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic that trial counsel 
could have pursued.”140  Second, the defendant must also show that 
the defense strategy was objectively reasonable.141  Finally, the 
defendant must prove causation, that counsel’s failure to pursue a 
strategy was linked to the conflict of interest.142  In 2018, the state 
supreme court again clarified that it was still an open question, as far 
as the Colorado supreme court was concerned, whether Sullivan 
applied beyond instances of prototypical multiple representation.143 
 
 137. See 2015 CO 5, ¶ 38, 341 P.3d 520, 530 (Colo. 2015). The court in West did not 
need to decide whether Sullivan applied beyond instances of multiple representation 
and therefore did not. See id.; see also Ybanez v. People, 2018 CO 16, ¶ 29, 413 P.3d 
700, 707 (Colo. 2018) (discussing how West does not stand for the proposition that 
Sullivan applies beyond instances multiple representation). 
 138. See West, ¶ 36, 341 P.3d at 530 (“Because Mickens involved a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict resulting from representation of 
someone other than a codefendant, we conclude that the Supreme Court remanded 
for evaluation of ‘adverse effect’ with the thought that other forms of multiple 
representation could constitute the ‘actively conflicting interests’ necessary to 
demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation under Sullivan.”). 
 139. See id. at ¶ 65, 341 P.3d at 534. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See Ybanez v. People, 2018 CO 16, ¶ 29, 413 P.3d 700, 707 (Colo. 2018). 
2021] PRESUMED PREJUDICE 239 
However, in 2019 the Colorado Court of Appeals Division IV 
conducted an about face on the state supreme court’s dicta in West 
and explicitly ruled that Sullivan does not apply to cases beyond 
prototypical multiple representation.144  The appeals court noted that 
“[a]pplying Sullivan in cases arising from a lawyer’s conflict of 
interest resulting from the lawyer’s self-interest would undermine the 
uniformity and simplicity of Strickland.”145  The Colorado Supreme 
Court has not revisited the issue as of the publication of this Note. 
ii. Idaho 
In February 2021, the Supreme Court of Idaho ruled that “claims 
of conflict of interest relating to successive representation require a 
showing of actual prejudice.”146  The court reasoned that –– unlike 
successive representation cases –– multiple representation cases 
require a presumption of prejudice because “[a]n attorney actively 
representing conflicting interests in concurrent representations poses 
such a circumstance where ineffective assistance is so likely that 
prejudice may be presumed.”147  Multiple representation cases 
present circumstances where “the likelihood that any lawyer, even a 
fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is . . . small.”148  
This would lead to a high likelihood of generating an unreliable 
verdict.149  However, in successive representation cases, “especially 
where the interests involved are unrelated to the former client’s 
case,” the threat of ineffective assistance is not as high.150  While 
successive representation “may suggest an apparent conflict of 
interest, at most it amounts to a cosmetic crack in the exterior of the 
trial proceedings; the overall foundation — and our confidence in the 
outcome — remains firm nonetheless.”151 
 
 144. See People v. Huggins, 2019 COA 116, ¶ 40, 463 P.3d 294, 300 (Colo. App. 
2019). 
 145. Id. ¶ 41, 463 P.3d at 301 (citing Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir. 
1995)). 
 146. State v. Alvarado, 481 P.3d 737, 748–49 (Idaho 2021). 
 147. Id. at 748. 
 148. Id. (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659–60 (1984)). 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. Id. 
240 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIX 
iii. Pennsylvania  
In 2014, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nearly shut the door on 
applying Sullivan outside of multiple representation cases.152  The 
court noted that it does not “foreclose the possibility that a conflict of 
interest may arise apart from dual representation — such as where an 
attorney is somehow beholden to the interests of another, 
antagonistic party without actually functioning as that party’s 
attorney.”153  And the court did not “deny that an attorney’s financial 
interests can conflict with those of his client under some 
circumstances . . . or that a conflict with the attorney’s private 
interests may adversely affect the attorney’s representation of his 
client, such as where defense counsel is himself under criminal 
investigation.”154  The court noted, however, that it was “guided by 
the Supreme Court’s own analysis of its Holloway/Sullivan line, in 
which it has criticized a tendency among the lower federal courts to 
apply Sullivan ‘unblinkingly to all kinds of alleged attorney ethical 
conflicts.’”155  The court has since reinforced its limited application of 
Sullivan multiple times.156 
B. States That Sometimes Apply Sullivan Beyond Instances of    
Multiple Representation 
Some state courts, such as Indiana, Kansas, and Nebraska have 
adopted judicial policies that, to varying degrees, sometimes apply 
Sullivan outside of conflicts of interest arising from multiple 
representation. 
i. Indiana 
In 2019, the Supreme Court of Indiana declared in Gibson v. State 
that it has “long been reluctant to depart from traditional [ineffective 
assistance of counsel] analysis beyond multiple-representation 
conflicts.”157  The court noted that such an approach “reflects the 
 
 152. See Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 620 (Pa. 2012). 
 153. Id. (citations omitted). 
 154. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 155. Id. (quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174 (2002)). 
 156. See Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 310 (Pa. 2017) (“Because this 
case involves successive and not dual representation, appellant must demonstrate he 
was prejudiced by any potential conflict of interest.”); see also Commonwealth v. 
Tharp, 101 A.3d 736, 754 (Pa. 2014) (“[T]his case involves successive and not dual 
representation, and Appellant must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any 
potential conflict of interest.” (citation omitted)). 
 157. Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 699 (Ind. 2019). 
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general view taken by the U.S. Supreme Court.”158  The court, 
however, explicitly declined to say whether the Sullivan presumption 
of prejudice applies only to multiple-representation conflicts.159  The 
court differentiated multiple representation conflicts from other 
conflicts noting that different conflicts of interest present different 
levels of concern.160  For example, unlike in instances of multiple 
representation, a conflict that impacts counsel’s personal interests 
“need not compromise the duty of loyalty — that is, counsel may still 
act in the client’s best interest even if detrimental to counsel’s best 
interest.”161  Therefore, the issue is if a “particular” conflict claim 
warrants the application of the Sullivan standard or the traditional 
Strickland prejudice standard.162  Some exceptions where Indiana 
courts have applied a Sullivan analysis to instances beyond multiple 
representation include where counsel represented a hostile witness,163 
where counsel’s personal legal problems were impacted by 
representation,164 and where counsel previously served as a judge pro 
tempore in the same matter.165 
ii. Kansas 
The Kansas Supreme Court has “yet to resolve 
the Mickens reservation by endorsing one or the other standard.”166  
That said, the state supreme court has recently erred on the side of 
applying the Sullivan standard to a broad range of conflicts of 
interest.  In 2012, the court noted that it “need not determine whether 
the adverse effect exception is the appropriate exception to be 
applied post-Mickens to successive representation situations 
because . . . the [s]tate did not argue any other test should be 
applied.”167  In 2013, the state supreme court again applied the 
Sullivan standard where a defendant claimed his counsel in a death-
 
 158. Id. (citing Mickens, 535 U.S. at 175–76). 
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Cowell v. State, 416 N.E.2d 839, 841 (Ind. 1981). 
 164. See Thompkins v. State, 482 N.E.2d 710, 712 (Ind. 1985). 
 165. See Hennings v. State, 638 N.E.2d 811, 813–14 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). 
 166. Sola-Morales v. State, 451 P.3d 887, 887 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019) (citation 
omitted). 
 167. State v. Galaviz, 291 P.3d 62, 77 (2012). In Galaviz, the conflict arose because 
defense counsel previously represented “as the guardian ad litem for the [minor] 
victim” in a case in which the defendant had pleaded guilty “to a charge of 
aggravated indecent liberties with a child under the age of 14.” Id. at 64–65. 
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penalty case had a conflict of interest by working on a flat-fee 
arrangement.168  In 2019, the state supreme court considered another 
conflict-of-interest case where defense counsel simultaneously 
represented a witness.169  Again, the court applied the Sullivan 
standard because “the State [did] not challenge the [lower court’s] 
application of the adverse effect standard to this conflict 
circumstance.”170 
In Sola-Morales v. State, a Kansas appeals court assumed but did 
not decide that Sullivan was the governing standard because it was 
“more favorable” to the defendant.171  The alleged conflict of interest 
in Sola-Morales was due to a breakdown in communication between 
defense counsel and client.172  The appeals court adopted a similar 
adverse-effect test to the Colorado court in West,173 requiring that the 
conflict caused counsel to forego a plausible defense tactic or 
strategy.174  The test also requires that the forgone strategy was 
objectively reasonable.175 
iii. Nebraska 
In 2018, the Supreme Court of Nebraska noted that most of the 
time the Strickland standard should apply to conflict-of-interest 
claims because “the scope of the duty of loyalty with respect to 
attorney self-interest is inherently vague and overlaps with 
professional effectiveness” –– and Strickland sets the “constitutional 
norm of adequate representation.”176  However, the court declined 
“to adopt a bright-line rule as to whether [Sullivan] or Strickland 
applies to personal interest conflicts,” because it could “envision a 
situation in which the conflict is so serious that the defendant should 
be relieved of the obligation to show a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different.”177  As such the court 
 
 168. See State v. Cheatham, 292 P.3d 318, 337 (Kan. 2013). 
 169. See State v. Moyer, 434 P.3d 829, 833 (Kan. 2019). 
 170. Id. at 841 (citation omitted). 
 171. See Sola-Morales, 451 P.3d at 887. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See supra discussion in Section III.A.i (discussing Colorado). 
 174. See Sola-Morales, 451 P.3d at 887. 
 175. See id. (preferring an objective component to the adverse effect test over an 
“after-the-fact opinion from the lawyer that the strategy would have been wholly 
ineffective”). 
 176. State v. Avina-Murillo, 917 N.W.2d 865, 878 (Neb. 2018). 
 177. Id. 
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held that “the better approach is to determine the appropriate 
standard on a case-by-case basis.”178 
C. States That Always Apply Sullivan to Actual                  
Conflicts of Interest  
Some state courts, such as Kentucky, Maryland, and Texas, have 
adopted judicial policies that always apply Sullivan to conflicts of 
interest claims beyond multiple representation. 
i. Kentucky 
In 2020, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that it applies the 
Sullivan standard to all conflicts of interest “where the alleged 
conflict is raised at some later point during post-conviction 
proceedings.”179 
ii. Maryland 
Maryland courts have “considered ineffective assistance claims 
involving personal conflicts of counsel and applied 
the Sullivan analysis, where the defendant failed to object in a timely 
manner.”180  In a 2012 case Taylor v. State, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, the highest court in the state, held that the presumption of 
prejudice under Sullivan applies to any instance where a defendant 
claims ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s bringing suit 
against their client for unpaid legal fees before the defendant’s trial.181  
This created an adversarial relationship that “infect[ed] the attorney-
client relationship with an element of distrust, likely to affect the 
reliability of the trial and ‘undermine confidence in the outcome.’”182  
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, therefore, justified its rule noting 
that the same concerns that the Supreme Court was addressing in 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Zapata v. Commonwealth, No. 2018-SC-000666-MR, 2020 WL 2091861, at *8 
(Ky. Apr. 30, 2020); see also Samuels v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.3d 709, 716 (Ky. 
2017) (ruling no conflict of interest was imputed between defendant’s public defender 
and victim’s public defender “[t]here was no evidence that [the public defenders] 
collaborated or were otherwise involved in each other’s cases during the period of 
overlapping representation. Nor was there any evidence that the two accessed, or had 
access to, the confidential client communications and information of the other”). 
 180. See Taylor v. State, 51 A.3d 655, 668 (Md. 2012) (citation omitted); see also 
Catala v. State, 897 A.2d 257 (Md. Ct Spec. App. 2006) (applying Sullivan to a 
conflict where defense counsel had accepted a job at the State Attorney’s Office). 
 181. 51 A.3d at 668–69. 
 182. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). 
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Glasser and Sullivan are equally applicable to conflict cases where 
counsel “has created an adversarial relationship with his client by 
initiating a civil suit against the client during the course of 
representation.”183  The Court of Appeals noted it would be difficult 
to determine the precise amount of prejudice that occurred at trial 
due to the attorney-created conflict and that a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was too important 
of a right to risk.184 
After finding that an attorney who sues his client is operating 
under an actual conflict of interest, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
in Taylor remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether 
the defendant’s conflict created an adverse effect on his 
representation.185  The Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the 
Fourth Circuit’s adverse-effect test from Mickens –– a test which the 
Supreme Court reviewed and declined to comment on when Mickens 
went to the High Court.186  Under that test, a defendant must 
establish three things.187  First, there must be “a plausible alternative 
defense strategy or tactic that his defense counsel might have 
pursued.”188  Second, that alternative tactic or strategy must have 
been “objectively reasonable under the facts of the case known to the 
attorney.”189  Finally, counsel’s failure to pursue that tactic or strategy 
must have been linked to the actual conflict.190 
iii. Texas 
In Acosta, a conflict of interest arose due to counsel’s perceived 
loyalty to a third party.191  Initially, an intermediate appellate court 
applied the Strickland standard and found that the defendant did not 
demonstrate that his defense counsel’s actions prejudiced him.192  In 
applying Strickland, the court noted that “Supreme Court has yet to 
 
 183. Id. at 669. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 672. The defendant claimed that he was adversely affected by counsel’s 
conflict because the two did not speak about the case for three and a half months, 
during which time a deadline for providing alibi witnesses came and went. Id. at 670. 
 186. See id. at 672. 
 187. See id. 
 188. Id. (quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 361 (4th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 535 
U.S. 162 (2002)). 
 189. Id. (quoting Mickens, 240 F.3d at 361). 
 190. See id. (quoting Mickens, 240 F.3d at 361). 
 191. See discussion supra Section I.C on duties to a third party. 
 192. See Acosta v. State, No. 04–03–00583–CR, 2005 WL 418224, at *2 (Tex. App. 
Feb. 23, 2005). 
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decide on the issue of whether [Sullivan] is limited to cases of 
multiple representation.”193 
The Court of Criminal Appeals, the highest court in the state, then 
ruled that the intermediate court’s decision to apply Strickland was an 
error and remanded the case to the intermediate court with 
instructions to apply Sullivan.194  The high court noted that “the 
ultimate question is whether any such conflict hindered the effective 
assistance of counsel at trial.”195  The court declined to distinguish 
between types of conflicts of interest that could serve as the basis of 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.196  The court noted that this 
case, where defense counsel represented the interests of a nonclient 
during the defendant’s trial, was “a clear example of how the danger 
of ineffective assistance via a conflict of interest is not strictly limited 
to the codefendant context.”197  On remand, the intermediate 
appellate court overturned the defendant’s conviction after finding 
that defendant met both elements of his Sullivan claim.198 
D. States That Have Adopted More Defendant-Friendly Standards 
Than the Sullivan Standard 
Some states, such as Alaska, Illinois, and Massachusetts, have 
incorporated higher standards for evaluating ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims based on attorney conflicts of interests. 
i. Alaska 
Alaska courts apply the Sullivan standard to all conflicts of interest, 
except in instances of an “egregious” conflict of interest199 –– in which 
case the courts apply an even higher standard.  For example, Alaska 
courts have applied Sullivan to conflict claims, where a defendant 
claimed a conflict of interest because the attorney’s mother knew the 
victim, when a public defender service represented two clients 
 
 193. Acosta v. State, 233 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 
 194. See id. at 356. 
 195. See id. at 355. 
 196. See id. at 354. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Acosta v. State, No. 04-03-00583-CR, 2008 WL 138076, at *1 (Tex. App, Jan. 
16, 2008) (mem.). The court on remand noted that “the conflict colored counsel’s 
actions during trial because he decided to introduce . . . evidence to help [the 
defendant’s wife] even though it contained evidence damaging to [the 
defendant’s] defense.” Id. 
 199. See State v. Carlson, 440 P.3d 364, 384 (Alaska Ct. App. 2019). 
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involved with the same confidential informant,200 and where the 
defendant alleged conflict due to counsel’s representation of a witness 
as a guardian ad litem.201  Alaska courts, however, will not apply the 
Sullivan standard to alleged conflicts that are abstract or present only 
the possibility of a conflict.202 
However, in instances of “egregious” conflicts of interests –– which 
the court defines as a joint representation of codefendants –– the 
court applies the standard set by the state high court in Moreau 
v. State.203  In applying the Moreau standard, the trial court must 
“affirmatively advise co-defendants who are jointly represented by 
the same attorney of the dangers inherent in such a joint 
representation.”204  If the trial court fails to do so and the defendant 
subsequently raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on 
their attorney’s multiple representation of codefendants, then the 
burden shifts to the State to prove that the joint representation 
caused no adverse effect to the defendant at trial.205 
ii. Illinois 
In 2008, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the Illinois 
“per se [conflict of interest] rule does not conflict with Mickens.”206  
 
 200. See McDonald v. State, No. A-11031, 2015 WL 1881591, at *5 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Apr. 22, 2015) (mem.). 
 201. See Carlson, 440 P.3d at 384 n.52; see also Lane v. State, 1994 WL 16196204, 
at *3–5 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1994) (mem.). 
 202. See Carlson, 440 P.3d at 384–85 (declining to apply Sullivan after determining 
that defense counsel was not operating under a conflict of interest because he 
represented conflicting defenses to law enforcement –– at one time arguing to that 
defendant accidently shot the victim but at another time arguing that a third party 
shot the victim); see also LaPierre v. State, 734 P.2d 997, 1004 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) 
(declining to apply the Sullivan presumption of prejudice where defendant “at most, 
demonstrated the existence of a conflict in the abstract. He . . . neither alleged nor 
demonstrated that his counsel ‘actively represented conflicting interests’ or that the 
purported conflict ‘adversely affected his lawyer’s performance’” (quoting Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 692 (1984)). 
 203. See Carlson, 440 P.3d at 384–85. 
 204. Id. at 384. 
 205. See id. 
 206. People v. Hernandez, 896 N.E.2d 297, 304–05 (Ill. 2008). However, other 
states have reached the opposite conclusion regarding per se conflicts of interest 
under Mickens. See Flaherty v. State, 221 So. 3d 633, 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) 
(rejecting the application of a per se conflict of interest rule in ineffective assistance 
of counsel conflict-of-interest cases noting that Mickens held that defendant must 
“establish that the conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel’s performance” 
(quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174 (2002)); see also Millette v. State, 183 
A.3d 1124, 1131–32 (R.I. 2018) (declining to apply a per se conflict of interest rule 
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The state supreme court grounds its per se rule in the Sixth 
Amendment.207  When Illinois courts evaluate conflict-of-interest 
claims, they “first resolve whether counsel labored under a per 
se conflict.”208  The state supreme court defines a per se conflict as 
“one in which facts about a defense attorney’s status engender, by 
themselves, a disabling conflict.  When a defendant’s attorney has a 
tie to a person or entity that would benefit from an unfavorable 
verdict for the defendant, a per se conflict arises.”209  If the court 
determines there is a per se conflict of interest, the defendant need 
not demonstrate that the conflict had an adverse effect on counsel’s 
performance.210 
In Illinois, a per se conflict of interest exists in three situations.211  
They are:  
[W]hen defense counsel has a prior or contemporaneous association 
with the victim, the prosecution, or an entity assisting the 
prosecution; . . . when defense counsel contemporaneously 
represents a prosecution witness; and . . . when defense counsel was 
a former prosecutor who had been personally involved in the 
prosecution of the defendant.212   
If a defendant cannot establish a per se conflict of interest, they can 
still show a violation of their constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel by demonstrating the Strickland standard –– an 
actual conflict of interest with an adverse effect on counsel’s 
performance.213 
iii. Massachusetts 
In Massachusetts, “art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights provides broader protection than the Sixth Amendment to the 
 
where defense counsel was not licensed to practice law in Rhode Island but was 
licensed to practice in Massachusetts). 
 207. See People v. Coslet, 364 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ill. 1977) (“This court adopted a per 
se conflict-of-interest rule in People v. Stoval . . . .”); see also People v. Stoval, 239 
N.E.2d 441, 443 (Ill. 1968) (applying a per se conflict of interest because “defendant’s 
right to counsel under the Constitution is more than a formality, and to allow him to 
be represented by an attorney with such conflicting interests as existed here without 
his knowledgeable consent is little better than allowing him no lawyer at all” 
(citations and decision’s edits omitted)). 
 208. People v. Hernandez, 896 N.E.2d 297, 303 (Ill. 2008). 
 209. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 210. Id. at 303. 
 211. See id. 
 212. Id. at 303–04 (citations omitted). 
 213. See id. at 304. 
248 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIX 
United States Constitution.”214  Under Massachusetts law, if a 
defendant demonstrates an actual conflict of interest they are 
automatically entitled to a new trial.215  They do not have to 
demonstrate that the conflict adversely affected their lawyer’s 
representation or that actual prejudice occurred during the 
representation.216  A defendant need not demonstrate more than an 
actual conflict of interest because “‘the effect of the conflict on the 
attorney’s representation of the defendant is likely to be pervasive 
and unpredictable, while the difficulty of proving it may be 
substantial, particularly as to things that may have been left not said 
or not done by counsel.’”217  Actual conflicts of interest under 
Massachusetts law are generally limited to three scenarios.218  First 
are instances of multiple representation.219  Second are instances 
where counsel maintains a close relationship with a material 
prosecution witness — such as an attorney-client relationship or a 
personal relationship.220  Third are instances when counsel has 
financial or other personal interests in a verdict unfavorable to their 
client.221  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found these 
scenarios to constitute actual conflicts of interest “because they 
epitomize the facial repugnance of an attorney’s divided loyalty, 
which places an unmistakable stain on the attorney-client 
relationship.”222  The court also distinguished these situations from 
the multitude of other scenarios that would, by default, be only a 
potential conflict of interest.223 
IV. HOW TO RECONCILE VARIOUS STATE INTERPRETATIONS OF 
MICKENS’S OPEN QUESTION 
The Supreme Court has noted that lower courts “have applied 
Sullivan ‘unblinkingly’ to ‘all kinds of alleged attorney ethical 
conflicts,’”224 and that Strickland is the norm for evaluating such 
 
 214. Commonwealth v. Cousin, 88 N.E.3d 822, 840 n.9 (Mass. 2018). 
 215. Id. at 831. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Mosher, 920 N.E.2d 285, 294 (Mass. 2012)). 
 218. See id. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See id. 
 221. See id. 
 222. Id. at 831–32 (citation omitted). 
 223. Id. at 832. 
 224. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174 (2002) (quoting Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 
1258, 1266 (5th Cir. 1995). 
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claims and applying Sullivan is the exception.225  State courts are split 
on what circumstances warrant this exception.  On one side of this 
debate are states such as Kentucky, Maryland, and Texas, which 
apply Sullivan to all types of alleged attorney conflicts of interests so 
long as there is an actual conflict of interest present.  On the other 
side of this debate are states like Colorado, Idaho, and Pennsylvania, 
which do not apply Sullivan to instances beyond prototypical multiple 
representation.  In the middle of this debate are states like Indiana, 
Kansas, and Nebraska, which have more of an ad-hoc approach to 
applying Sullivan beyond instances of multiple representation. 
When counsel concurrently represents two codefendants but must 
advance the interests of one client at the expense of the other, counsel 
breaches the duty of loyalty.226  The breach is so significant that “the 
likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide 
effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is 
appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.”227  In 
Beets v. Scott, Judge King of the Fifth Circuit proposed that a conflict 
outside of multiple representation warranting Sullivan is “of a kind 
not frequently or normally encountered in the practice of law” and is 
an “exceptional situation, where the divergence between the lawyer’s 
self-interest and his client’s interest poses an extraordinary threat to 
the lawyer’s duty of loyalty.”228 
According to the Supreme Court, the key trait of a Sullivan claim 
that determines if it warrants a presumption of prejudice is 
pervasiveness –– that is, the conflict is so pervasive throughout the 
representation that its impact is too difficult to detect.229  This trait 
should be used to determine what other conflicts of interest warrant a 
Sullivan presumption of prejudice as well. 
 
 225. See id. at 175–76 (finding “the language of Sullivan itself does not clearly 
establish, or indeed even support,” applying Sullivan unblinkingly to all conflict-of-
interest claims). 
 226. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). 
 227. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659–60 (1984) (citation omitted). 
 228. 65 F.3d 1258, 1294 (5th Cir. 1995) (King, J., dissenting). 
 229. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (“[P]rejudice is presumed when counsel is 
burdened by an actual conflict of interest. In those circumstances, counsel breaches 
the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel’s duties. Moreover, it is difficult 
to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by 
conflicting interests.”); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490–91 (1978) 
(discussing how in multiple representation scenarios “even with a record of the 
sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a 
conflict on the attorney’s representation of a client”). 
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A. Proposed Test to Determine Whether a Court Should 
Apply the Sullivan or Strickland Standard to a              
Conflict of Interest 
This Note proposes a three-part test for a reviewing court to 
determine whether, in reviewing a conflict-of-interest claim, it should 
apply a Sullivan presumption of prejudice or require a defendant to 
demonstrate prejudice under Strickland.  Steps one and two of this 
Note’s proposed test overlap with the two-prong analysis of Sullivan 
to determine if there was an actual conflict of interest.  Step three 
requires the reviewing court to determine if the conflict is pervasive 
to the point that its impact is too difficult to detect.  If the impact of 
the conflict is too pervasive, a Sullivan presumption of prejudice is 
warranted. 
For a reviewing court considering whether to presume prejudice 
for a conflict-of-interest claim, this Note proposes that reviewing 
courts start their analysis by simply applying the two-pronged Sullivan 
analysis to determine if there was an actual conflict of interest.  If the 
claim cannot satisfy the basic elements set forth by Sullivan, there is 
no need to consider whether it should receive the Sullivan 
presumption of prejudice to bypass the more rigid requirements of 
Strickland.  To determine if there was an actual conflict of interest, 
the court must first determine whether there was a conflict of interest 
and, second, whether that conflict had an adverse effect on counsel’s 
performance.230  A conflict exists where counsel’s representing one 
client would be “directly adverse to another client; or there is a 
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a 
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the 
lawyer.”231 
Once a conflict of interest is established, the second step of 
Sullivan is to see if the conflict adversely affected counsel’s 
representation.232  Courts have different takes on what an adverse 
 
 230. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171 (“‘[A]n actual conflict of interest’ mean[s] 
precisely a conflict that affected counsel’s performance . . . .” (emphasis removed)). 
 231. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1)–(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see 
also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356 n.3 (198) (Marshall, J., concurring in part) 
(noting that “‘[c]onflict of interest’ is a term that is often used and seldom defined” 
and looking to the ABA standards for guidance). 
 232. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 172–73; see also Taylor v. State, 51 A.3d 655, 670 
(Md. 2012) (“The potential violation of [the ethics rules], though, at least establishes 
that [counsel] operated under a potential conflict. Only if [counsel’s] conflict was an 
‘actual conflict of interest,’ due to its adverse effect on his representation of 
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effect on representation means.  In recent years, some state courts 
have adopted the Fourth Circuit’s test as applied in Mickens.233  
Under this test, a defendant must first identify a “plausible alternative 
defense strategy or tactic that trial counsel could have pursued.”234 
Second, the defendant must also show that the defense strategy was 
objectively reasonable.235  Finally, the defendant must prove causation 
–– counsel’s failure to pursue a strategy was linked to the conflict of 
interest.236 
If a court determines that an attorney-client relationship had a 
conflict that adversely affected the defendant, then the two Sullivan 
elements are met.  The third step of this Note’s proposed test is to see 
if it is the type of conflict that warrants a presumption of prejudice. 
Prejudice is presumed in multiple representation of codefendant 
scenarios because the impact of the conflict is indiscernible.  There is 
an inherent “difficulty of proving that prejudice” in such situations.237  
These are instances where “even with a record of the sentencing 
hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact 
of a conflict on the attorney’s representation of a client.”238  
Alternatively, typical Strickland claims have a prejudice requirement 
because “if and when counsel’s ineffectiveness ‘pervades’ a trial, it 
does so (to the extent we can detect it) through identifiable mistakes.  
[Courts] can assess how those mistakes affected the outcome.”239  
Prejudice helps a court determine whether counsel was, despite 
deficient performance in one area, overall effective in their 
representation of the defendant or whether counsel’s ineffectiveness 
harmed the jury.240  A defendant’s constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel is housed under the Sixth Amendment’s purpose 
of ensuring a fair trial,241 and for counsel to be considered 
 
Petitioner, would Petitioner then be entitled to a presumption of prejudice to the 
outcome of his trial.”). 
 233. See West v. People, 2015 CO 5, ¶¶ 40–60, 341 P.3d 520, 531–33 (Colo. 2015) 
(discussing the federal circuit split in adverse effect tests and adopting the Fourth 
Circuit’s test); see also Sola-Morales v. State, 451 P.3d 887, 894 (Kan. 2019) (applying 
an adverse effect test with an objective component like as the Fourth Circuit does); 
Taylor, 51 A.3d at 670–72 (adopting the Fourth Circuit’s test as well). 
 234. West, 2015 CO 5, ¶¶ 57–64, 341 P.3d at 533–34. 
 235. See id. ¶ 59, 341 P.3d at 533. 
 236. See id. ¶ 61, 341 P.3d at 534. 
 237. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 175. 
 238. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490–91 (1978). 
 239. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150–51 (2006). 
 240. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011). 
 241. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984); see also Gonzalez-
Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146–47; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). 
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constitutionally ineffective, a court must reasonably believe that 
counsel’s mistake actually harmed the defense.242  A court 
determining whether or not to apply a Sullivan presumption of 
prejudice, therefore, should look at the nature of the conflict to see if 
it is the type that would have detectable mistakes or not.  If the 
conflict would permit a court to look at specific parts of the trial 
record for evidence of the conflict, such as specific witness testimony, 
then the defendant should have to demonstrate prejudice under 
Strickland.  If, however, a court determines that the conflict 
permeates throughout the representation to the extent that prejudice 
would be too hard to detect,243 then the court should apply the 
Sullivan presumption of prejudice to the claim. 
B. Applying the Proposed Test to Various Types of          
Conflicts-of-Interest Claims 
This section discusses how a reviewing court might apply this 
Note’s proposed test to determine whether to apply the Sullivan or 
Strickland standard upon review of a conflict-of-interest claim.  This 
section will apply this Note’s three-part test to four previously 
discussed fact patterns. 
In Alvarado, the Idaho Supreme Court considered a conflict of 
interest that arose out of counsel’s duty to former client.244  There, the 
defendant appealed his conviction claiming that his public defender 
had a conflict of interest because counsel had previously represented 
a prosecution witness.245  The defendant argued that counsel’s 
continuing ethical obligations to the witness prevented a rigorous 
cross examination of the witness.246  The first step in applying this 
Note’s proposed test is to apply the first prong of Sullivan.  A court 
should determine whether there was indeed a conflict of interest. 
Under the Model Rules, a lawyer who has formerly represented a 
client cannot represent another client in a related matter where that 
person’s interests are materially adverse to those of the former client, 
unless the client consents in writing.247  Furthermore, if a court 
reviewing the Alvarado claim determined that there was a significant 
risk that counsel’s loyalty could be divided between the defendant 
 
 242. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147. 
 243. See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1903 (2017) (noting how an 
error can be structural if the effects of the error are too difficult to measure). 
 244. See State v. Alvarado, 481 P.3d 737, 740 (Idaho 2021). 
 245. See id. 
 246. See id. 
 247. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
2021] PRESUMED PREJUDICE 253 
and the former prosecution witness, that would be a conflict under 
the Model Rules.248  Assuming this is the case, the Alvarado claim 
satisfies step one of Sullivan.  Step two of Sullivan is to determine if 
the conflict had an adverse effect on the defendant’s representation.  
The Idaho Supreme Court, in actually ruling on Alvarado, found that 
counsel attempted to impeach the witness’ credibility by attempting 
to ask about the witness’ own incarceration — the lower trial court, 
however, prevented counsel from pursuing this line of questioning.249  
The Idaho Supreme Court determined that counsel’s attempt at 
impeaching the witness meant that counsel did not withhold in his 
representation.250  Therefore, the conflict of interest had no adverse 
effect on the defendant.251  Accordingly, this claim fails the second 
prong a Sullivan analysis.  There is no need to move on to the third 
step of this Note’s proposed test to determine whether to apply 
prejudice. 
In Acosta, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered a 
conflict of interest that arose out of counsel’s duty to a third party.252  
In this case, the defendant claimed that defense counsel had a conflict 
of interest when counsel put forward evidence at trial that was solely 
beneficial to the defendant’s wife’s efforts to retain custody of her 
children.253  Counsel admitted that he introduced the evidence at trial 
“solely to help” the defendant’s wife and it was “no help whatsoever” 
to the defendant.254  Applying this Note’s proposed test, the first step 
is to determine if there is a conflict of interest.  The wife was not a 
client,255 so counsel had no conflicting duties to another client.  A 
reviewing court could potentially find that this claim fails the first 
prong of Sullivan.  Or perhaps a court would determine that counsel’s 
loyalty to the wife conflicted with counsel’s loyalty to his client and 
created a conflict.  Nevertheless, assuming that the defendant satisfies 
the first prong of Sullivan, the second element of the test is to 
determine if the conflict adversely affected representation.256  In this 
instance, counsel admitted his actions adversely affected the 
 
 248. ID.  r. 1.7(a)(1)–(2). 
 249. See Alvarado, 481 P.3d at 740. 
 250. See id. 
 251. See id. 
 252. See Acosta v. State, 233 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 
 253. See id. at 349, 352. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See id. at 351. 
 256. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002). 
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representation of his client.257  An alternative and reasonable defense 
strategy could have been simply not introducing the evidence that was 
solely beneficial to the wife.  A court reviewing this claim likely could 
find that it passes the second prong of Sullivan.  The third step of this 
Note’s proposed test is to determine if a court can isolate the impact 
of the conflict or not.  A reviewing court could isolate its analysis 
specifically to the evidence that was admitted for the benefit of the 
wife to see if it changed the outcome of the trial or not.  A 
presumption of prejudice, therefore, would not be warranted and 
Strickland would be the reviewing standard under this Note’s 
proposed test. 
In Sola-Morales, the Court of Appeals of Kansas considered a 
conflict of interest that arose out of counsel’s own interests –– 
whether counsel’s “lie” and purported coverup created an actual 
conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s representation.258  
The defendant claimed that counsel: “misrepresented the grounds for 
the trial continuances, attributing them to the State’s request rather 
than his own.  And [counsel] ostensibly enhanced that conflict by 
falsely telling [defendant] that the district court denied his pro se 
motion to dismiss, when [counsel] actually withdrew it.”259  The 
defendant claimed he was adversely affected from the conflict when 
counsel “torpedo[ed] [a] hearing on [a] motion to dismiss to avoid 
those lies coming to light.”260  Step one of this Note’s proposed test is 
to apply the first prong of a Sullivan analysis and question whether 
this claim contained a conflict of interest.  In this instance, the district 
court made a factual finding that counsel did not lie and that counsel 
had no reason to lie.261  Because counsel did not lie or cover anything 
up, there were no conflicting duties between counsel and defendant, 
and therefore there was no conflict.  Accordingly, this claim fails the 
first prong of a Sullivan analysis.  There would be no reason for a 
court applying this Note’s proposed test to further consider whether 
this claim warrants a Sullivan presumption of prejudice.  In reality, 
the Kansas Court of Appeals nonetheless did analyze this claim under 
the second prong of a Sullivan claim to determine whether the 
conflict in this case adversely affected the defendant.262  The court 
found that there was no adverse effect on the defendant’s 
 
 257. See Acosta, 233 S.W.3d at 352. 
 258. See Sola-Morales v. State, 451 P.3d 887 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. See id. 
 262. See id. 
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representation because the motion that counsel allegedly torpedoed 
was, in fact, meritless.263  This case also fails the second prong of a 
Sullivan claim.264  As such, there would be no need for a reviewing 
court applying this Note’s proposed test to determine whether there 
should be a Sullivan presumption of prejudice. 
In Wood v. Georgia, the Supreme Court considered a conflict of 
interest that arose out of counsel’s duty to another client.265  There, 
three defendants who worked at an adult entertainment store were 
charged with distributing obscene materials.266  The defendants were 
represented by their employer’s lawyer.267  The Supreme Court 
speculated that the employer withheld the fine payments to create 
standing for a constitutional “test case.”268  Because defense counsel 
represented both the employer and the employee defendants, it was 
unclear whether counsel “single-mindedly” pursued the defendants’ 
interests (seeking leniency for default on the payments) –– or whether 
counsel was operating with a conflict of interest arising from duties to 
his other client, the employer.269  For a reviewing court to determine 
if the Sullivan or Strickland standard applies to a fact pattern such as 
this one, the reviewing court should start by applying the first prong 
of a Sullivan analysis to determine if there was a conflict of interest.  
Under the Model Rules, a conflict exists when “the representation of 
one client will be directly adverse to another client.”270  Here, the 
employer’s desire to keep the defendant’s fines in place was likely 
directly adverse to the defendants’ liberty interests.271  Therefore, 
there is a conflict and step one of this Note’s test is met.  Next, a 
reviewing court should determine if the conflict had an adverse effect 
on the defendants’ representation.  Here, a reviewing court could 
likely find that defense counsel’s representation was adversely 
affected at the defendants’ probation revocation hearing.272  A 
reviewing court could find that counsel limited his advocacy for his 
clients’ liberty interests in order to advance the interests of the 
employer, which desired to make a test case.273  Therefore, the second 
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 265. 450 U.S. 261, 263–64 (1981). 
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prong of Sullivan review and step two of this Note’s proposed test are 
met –– the conflict had an adverse effect on the defendants.  Step 
three of this Note’s proposed test is to determine if the effects of the 
conflict are difficult to detect.  A reviewing court might find that the 
conflict was too intertwined with every aspect of the defendant’s 
representation.  There was no clear aspect of counsel’s representation 
that one could examine more thoroughly to see if it prejudiced the 
defendants because counsel may have been serving the employer’s 
interests at any given moment.  If this were the case, having satisfied 
all three elements of this Note’s test, the court could rule that 
defendants would not have to demonstrate Strickland prejudice.  On 
the other hand, consider that the employer paid the defendant’s legal 
fees and fines at the start of the case.274  But “[f]or some reason, 
however, the employer declined to provide money to pay the fines” as 
the case progressed.275  A reviewing court, therefore, might determine 
that there was an exact moment during counsel’s representation 
where the interests of the employer and the interests of the 
defendants diverged and a conflict of interest arose.  If this were the 
case, the reviewing court could point to a specific moment in the 
representation to determine if it negatively impacted the defendants 
and the Strickland prejudice standard would, therefore, be 
appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note’s proposed test determines whether a criminal defendant 
should get a “do-over” because of a Sixth Amendment violation.  
This Note argues for evaluating conflicts of interest to see if they are 
so pervasive to the point that their impact is too difficult to detect.  If 
a conflict satisfies both elements of Sullivan, an actual conflict that 
adversely affects representation, and if the conflict is pervasive, then 
Sullivan prejudice should apply.  If a conflict fails any of these factors, 
then Strickland should apply.  Such an approach aligns with the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence evaluating ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims under the Sixth Amendment. 
The test is likely to err on the side of applying Strickland prejudice 
to most conflict-of-interest claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Some scholars may question whether the Strickland standard is the 
proper standard to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims at 
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all.276  Nevertheless, such an outcome is in line with the Supreme 
Court’s concerns of easily upsetting the finality of convictions.277  
State courts, moreover, may impose additional protections to 
defendants based on state laws and state constitutions.278 
The goal of the Sullivan exception to the Strickland prejudice 
requirement is to keep a trial fundamentally fair.  Given the Supreme 
Court’s signaling that lower courts have, perhaps incorrectly, applied 
Sullivan unblinkingly and continued reminders that the default rule is 
the Strickland standard,279 this Note argues that it is inappropriate to 
apply the Sullivan standard to all alleged conflicts of interest on 
review.280  However, given the Supreme Court’s application of the 
Sullivan standard in Wood and Mickens, cases beyond prototypical 
multiple representation, this Note argues that a rule mandating the 
blind application of the Strickland standard to all conflict claims that 
are not multiple representation is not the right solution either.  The 
right solution is somewhere in the middle –– not applying Sullivan 
unblinkingly but allowing for the application of Sullivan in cases 
where the impact of the actual conflict of interest is so pervasive that 
it would be too difficult to demonstrate prejudice otherwise.281 
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